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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis describes seismic hazards, including fault rupture, liquefaction, landslides, 
and site amplification, using Los Angeles as a case study. Water supply simulation 
results are presented for a 7.8 MW earthquake on the San Andreas Fault. Severe water 
losses are shown after 24 hrs, with nearly 2,700 locations of pipeline damage and a 
66% decrease in normal water service. The water supply system was modeled with 
and without reservoirs that have been removed from service to meet water quality 
standards. The results show that opening the disconnected reservoirs immediately after 
a serious earthquake is an effective strategy for emergency response. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Seismic hazards and water supply performance were investigated for a scenario 7.8 
MW earthquake in Los Angeles, CA. The study was conducted in coordination with 
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) as part of the Great 
Southern California ShakeOut, which was the largest earthquake preparedness drill in 
US history, with an estimated 5.47 million people participating [Cox and Pierce, 
2008]. Under the guidance of the US Geological Survey (USGS) a multi-disciplinary 
team of experts developed the ShakeOut scenario to examine the regional effects of a 
major earthquake in southern California using physics-based computer simulations of 
fault rupture and earthquake ground motions [USGS, 2008a]. The ShakeOut Scenario 
earthquake is a 7.8 MW earthquake on the southernmost 300 km of the San Andreas 
Fault (SAF), which ruptures from the Salton Sea northwest to Lake Hughes, passing 
east of Los Angeles. The ShakeOut scenario strong ground motion model includes 
attenuation, site effects, directivity, and radiation patterns at different locations in 
southern California. The losses resulting from the ShakeOut Scenario earthquake are 
estimated at 1,800 deaths and $213 billion [USGS, 2008a]. 
 
The seismic performance of the LADWP water distribution system was simulated with 
special software and a hydraulic network model developed through collaboration 
among Cornell University researchers, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake 
Engineering Research (MCEER), and LADWP. The modeling accounts for the 
response of heavily damaged hydraulic networks through the elimination of pipelines 
and associated facilities that cannot sustain reliable flow and the analysis of the 
remaining parts of the system that are still functional.  
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This paper describes the decision support system that was developed in partnership 
with LADWP to model the response of its water supply to earthquake effects. It 
describes the ShakeOut strong ground motions and locations of permanent ground 
deformation resulting from fault rupture, liquefaction, landslides, and ground lurching 
caused by failure in soft clay deposits.. The models for simulating pipeline 
performance under transient and permanent ground deformation are discussed, and the 
results of the ShakeOut earthquake/water supply simulations are summarized with 
respect to pipeline repairs and serviceability. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
 
A decision support system was developed by using the LADWP water supply as a test 
bed. The system is intended to plan operations, emergency response, and new system 
facilities and configurations to optimize water supply performance during and after 
earthquakes [O’Rourke et al, 2008]. The system is generic, and the architecture of its 
computer programs is adaptable to any water supply. The system works in conjunction 
with an easily accessible hydraulic network model, EPANET, which is available on-
line from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA, 2007] as well as a special 
program for damaged network flow modeling, known as Graphical Iterative Response 
Analysis for Flow Following Earthquakes (GIRAFFE). Detailed information about the 
development and evaluation of GIRAFFE is provided by Bonneau [2008], Wang 
[2006], Shi [2006], Shi et al. [2006], and Wang and O’Rourke [2007]. 
 
As described by O’Rourke, et al. [2008], the hydraulic network model utilized by the 
decision support system accounts for all 11,691 km of water trunk and distribution 
pipelines and related facilities (e.g., tanks, reservoirs, pressure regulation stations, etc.) 
in the LADWP system. The system also accounts for the aggregated seismic hazard in 
Los Angeles through an ensemble of 59 scenario earthquakes. The 59 scenario 
earthquakes provide a library of seismic scenarios, from which engineers can select 
specific scenarios or combinations of scenarios to assess system performance. The 
decision support system works with risk and reliability assessment tools to provide 
metrics of system performance. The computer simulations account for the interaction 
of the water and electric power supplies, and model output can be used to evaluate the 
regional economic and community impacts of water losses. All system input and 
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output can be visualized through GIS with advanced query logic and web-based 
features. The simulations are dynamic in time, and can account for loss of service as 
tanks and local reservoirs lose water over time through leaks and breaks in pipelines. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EARTHQUAKE STRONG MOTION 
 
The ShakeOut scenario earthquake is a physics-based simulation of strong motion that 
accounts for site effects, directivity, and radiation patterns. The simulation includes a 
kinematic rupture description and a velocity model developed from the characteristics 
of southern California bedrock. The strongest  ground shaking in the City of Los 
Angeles is locally in the range of 200 cm/sec  and lasts for about  20-45 sec [USGS, 
2008a].  
 
Figure 1 (a) shows a regional map of the Los Angeles area in which the LADWP 
water distribution system is located relative to the SAF. The central part of the 
LADWP system, centered on downtown Los Angeles, is located approximately 55 km 
from the SAF.  The strong ground motion in the area can be described by peak ground 
velocity (PGV) and peak ground acceleration (PGA). The shape files for the areal 
distribution of PGA and PGV of both maps are available at the USGS WebSite 
[USGS, 2008b]. According to the model, the strong shaking in the Los Angeles area 
starts 70 sec. after initiation of the fault rupture and lasts for a total of 55 sec.. Figure 1 
(b) presents the spatial distribution of PGA generated by the earthquake. The San 
Fernando Valley and the southern part of the service area are the locations of 
maximum PGA (approximately 0.3 g) affecting the LADWP system. Figure 1 (c) 
presents the SAF rupture and distribution of PGV. The locations of maximum PGV 
correspond to deep sediment basins, which amplify the incoming ground waves to 
produce locally high PGV. There are two main locations of wave amplification in the 
northern part of the San Fernando Valley and an area southeast of the Civic Center, 
where PGVs approach 200 cm/sec.   
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Figure 1. (a) Location of San Andreas Fault and LADWP system, (b) PGA contours, 
(c) PGV contours and SAF. 
 
Pipeline damage caused by transient ground deformation (TGD), or seismic waves, is 
estimated by means of regressions developed from previous earthquake records. Those 
regressions correlate pipeline repair rates (RR), defined as the number of repairs per 
km, with PGV. Regressions developed by Jeon and O’Rourke [2005] and Wang 
[2006] for water distribution and trunk lines, respectively, are used. 
 
Demands from the distribution pipelines are modeled as flow requirements at 1,052 
demand nodes throughout the system. Distribution pipeline behavior is accounted for 
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by fragility curves that correlate distribution system demands with RRs. In addition to 
modeling pipeline damage, it is important to account for the vulnerability of other 
facilities in the system. For example, tank damage is modeled by fragility curves 
developed for different types of tanks used by LADWP. Fragility curves proposed by 
O’Rourke and So [2000] for steel tanks and fragility curves used in HAZUS [FEMA, 
2006] for concrete tanks are incorporated in the simulations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EARTHQUAKE-INDUCED PERMANENT GROUND DEFORMATION 
 
In addition to seismic ground waves, earthquakes trigger permanent ground 
deformation (PGD) primarily in the form of fault rupture, liquefaction-induced ground 
movement, and landslides. The ShakeOut SAF rupture at its intersection with the Los 
Angeles Aqueducts (LAAs) is 3.3 m in length [USGS, 2008a]. Because such a large 
fault rupture will disrupt the aqueducts, the water distribution network response was 
simulated by removing the LAAs from the LADWP hydraulic network model. The 
City of Los Angeles gets 85% of its water from the LAAs, California Aqueduct (CA), 
and Colorado River Aqueduct (CRA), and 15% from groundwater sources. The CA 
and CRA are also severely damaged by fault rupture and strong ground shaking 
[Davis, 2009a,b].  
 
The ShakeOut scenario provides predictions of PGD associated with soil liquefaction 
in the form of settlement caused by post-liquefaction consolidation and lateral 
spreading. Post-liquefaction consolidation is caused by loss of volume in the soil as 
porewater pressures dissipate after liquefaction. As described by USGS [2008a], 
locations of potentially liquefiable soils were identified in the ShakeOut modeling, and 
the method proposed by Tokimatsu and Seed [1987] was used in conjunction with 
estimated PGAs to predict soil settlements. Horizontal ground movement associated 
with lateral spreading was estimated according to the procedures used in HAZUS 
[FEMA, 2003], which are based on the Liquefaction Severity Index proposed by Youd 
and Perkins [1986]. 
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As described by USGS [2008a], mapped geologic units were categorized into 
landslide susceptibility classes according to the methods developed by Wilson and 
Keefer [1985]. Similar to the approach taken for liquefaction, landslide PGDs were 
estimated by following the procedures in HAZUS [FEMA, 2003] whereby the ratio of 
predicted to critical acceleration for various landslide susceptibility classes are used in 
combination with  analytical results summarized by Makdisi and Seed [1978] to 
estimate earthquake-induced displacments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Areas of PGD effects in Los Angeles 
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Within the LADWP system, there are only a few zones of high landslide susceptibility 
indentified in the ShakeOut Scenario [USGS, 2008a], with low impact on water 
supply performance. The predominant PGD hazards affecting the LADWP water 
distribution network are liquefaction and ground lurching triggered by failure in soft 
clay deposits.. Figure 2 provides a map of the LADWP system in which areas of 
liquefaction hazards and estimates of PGD provided with the ShakeOut Scenario are 
identified. Also identified is the La Cienega area, which is discussed in detail in the 
section of this paper entitled La Cienega. As discussed in the next section, water 
pipeline damage during the 1994 Northridge earthquake was caused by ground 
lurching in the West Valley area.  
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CHAPTER 5 
NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE PIPELINE PERFORMANCE 
 
To help with the evaluation of pipeline performance, pipeline damage during the 1994 
Northridge earthquake was used to identify locations in the LADWP system that are 
vulnerable to earthquake effects because of underlying geotechnical conditions. The 
1994 Northridge earthquake caused the most extensive damage to a US water supply 
system since the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. LADWP and the Metropolitan Water 
District  of Southern California (MWD) trunk lines (nominal pipe diameter  600 
mm) were damaged at 74 locations within the LADWP service area, and the LADWP 
distribution pipeline (nominal pipe diameter < 600 mm) system was repaired at 1,013 
locations [Jeon and O’Rourke, 2005]. 
 
Information on water pipeline repairs after the Northridge earthquake, including 
location, pipe diameter and composition were collected and geocoded [Jeon and 
O’Rourke, 2005; O’Rourke and Toprak, 1997]. In addition, approximately 11,000 km 
of distribution mains and 1,000 km of trunk lines operated throughout the City of Los 
Angeles were digitized. This information was incorporated into a GIS database using 
ArcInfo software, where it was combined with corrected strong motion records [Jeon 
and O’Rourke, 2005]. The records from 241 Northridge earthquake strong motion 
instruments were examined, and the data from 164 corrected records were selected for 
detailed analyses.  
 
Cast iron pipelines, comprised approximately 75% of the LADWP distribution 
network at the time of the Northridge earthquake. Hence, there was sufficiently broad 
coverage of cast iron pipelines so that their RRs represent seismic response throughout 
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the entire system. Moreover, cast iron is a brittle material, sensitive to seismic effects, 
and thus a suitable choice for evaluating the spatial variation of the earthquake’s 
influence. 
 
Figure 3 presents a map of cast iron distribution pipeline repair locations and repair 
rate (RR) contours for pipeline damage. The RR contours were developed by dividing 
the map into 2 km x 2 km areas, determining the number of pipeline repairs in each 
area, and dividing the number of repairs by the length of distribution pipeline in that 
area. Contours then were drawn from the spatial distribution of RRs, each of which 
was centered on its tributary area. The 2 km x 2 km grid was found to provide a good 
representation of damage patterns for the map scale of the figure [Jeon and O’Rourke, 
2005] O’Rourke and Toprak, 1997]. 
 
The contour interval of 0.1 RR/km in Figure 3 is equal to the average cast iron 
pipeline repair rate for the entire system. Concentrations of contour lines therefore 
represent areas where damage to the pipelines was above the mean. The scale of the 
damage and intensity of the seismic effects are proportional to the number of contour 
intervals in a given area. 
 
Most areas of RR contour concentrations coincide with areas of liquefaction hazards 
identified in the ShakeOut Scenario (see Figure 2). The liquefaction characterization 
and PGD predictions in the ShakeOut Scenario were checked and judged to be suitable 
at all locations except the two zones of RR contour concentrations identified in Figure 
3 as the West Valley and La Cienega areas.  
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Figure 3. Pipeline repair rate contours for the 1994 Northridge earthquake. 
 
Investigations performed by USGS after the Northridge earthquake disclosed layers of 
soft, normally consolidated clay in the West Valley area that contributed to lateral 
movements as high as 300 to 600 mm [Holzer et al., 1999]. Newmark sliding block 
analyses [O’Rourke, 1998] show that ground movement of the same magnitude and 
direction of movement as mapped by USGS were caused by low undrained shear 
strength of the clay in combination with near source pulses of high acceleration. The 
principal cause of ground displacement and pipeline damage in the West Valley area 
therefore is regarded as ground failure and slip in the soft clay deposits. This 
phenomenon of permanent ground movement in the absence of liquefiable soils is 
often referred to as lurching. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LA CIENEGA 
 
The La Cienega area, as defined in this study, is shown in Figure 4. The surficial soils 
are described as younger Quaternary soils, consisting of alternating beds of fine to 
medium grained sands, silts, and clay, associated either with alluvial fan deposits or 
with sediments deposited along and adjacent to Ballona Creek and the ancestral course 
of the Los Angeles River [Mattison and Lloyd, 1998; Lisle, 1998]. Historic high water 
tables are plotted in this area at 3 - 7m below ground surface, and the soils are 
identified as susceptible to liquefaction [USGS, 1999 a,b; Mattison and Lloyd, 1998; 
Lisle, 1998]. 
 
This area was the location of serious bridge damage during the Northridge earthquake. 
Yashinski [1995a and 1995b] described two locations of bridge damage at the two 
intersections I-10 with La Cienega Blvd. and Faifax Ave. where failure of reinforced 
concrete columns resulted in collapse at the I-10 overpasses. It was noted in the 
reconnaissance observations that the bridge failures were consistent with ground 
motions higher than those recorded by the nearest strong motion instruments. One-
dimensional site response analyses were subsequently performed in which earthquake 
motions recorded 2.3 km away were used in combination with deep shear wave 
velocity profiles measured at both the I-10-La Cienega and recorded strong motion 
sites to estimate surface motion at the I-10 collapse location [Boore, et al., 2003]. The 
analytical results show ground motions at the I-10-La Cienega site higher than those 
from the nearest recording by a factor of 1.2 to 1.6. The increased analytical motion 
was mainly due to softer sediments in the upper 12.5 m of the soil column. 
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The earliest topographic and geologic maps of the area were collected and reviewed, 
including the 1893-94 [USGS, 1896] and 1926 USGS topographic maps [USGS, 
1926; USGS, 1925]. Features from the 1926 topographic map were digitized and 
combined in Figure 4 with current topographic and street maps as well as the locations 
of Northridge earthquake pipeline repairs and I-10 bridge damage. 
 
Figure 4. Map of La Cienega area 
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The highest levels of pipeline repairs were located in a zone of low elevation near the 
southern boundary of the alluvial fan deposits south of the Santa Monica Mountains 
and immediately north of Ballona Creek, which is located along the northern flank of 
the Baldwin Hills. The zone of highest damage was located just north of the damaged 
I-10 bridge. It was centered along La Cienega Blvd., which follows the course of an 
old tributary to Ballona Creek where swamps were identified in the 1926 USGS 
topographic map [USGS, 1926].  
 
The water distribution pipelines in this zone are 70 - 90 years old, composed mostly of 
cast iron with lead-caulked joints, with nominal diameters of 150 - 300 mm of which 
150 mm is the predominant size. Records at LADWP show that pipeline repairs in this 
zone since the Northridge earthquake are 2 - 3 times higher than those in adjacent 
parts of the system. Elevated levels of continued pipeline repair have been observed 
after previous earthquakes in zones of high seismic disturbance [Isenberg, 1986]. The 
high post-earthquake repair rates not only show that the pipelines are vulnerable due to 
their state of repair, but that the high levels of maintenance may provide indirect 
evidence of locally high seismic hazard. 
 
Borehole data were collected from the LADWP, California State Water Resources 
Control Board [2009], and the Rosrine project database [Rosrine, 2001]. The borehole 
locations are shown in Figure 4, and a subsurface cross-section developed from the 
borehole data is presented in Figure 5. The borehole data were collected from 6 
different sites and involve 9 borings, each of which is numbered in Figure 4. Close 
spacing of numbers indicates sites where data from more than one boring was used. 
Groundwater levels shown for borings 1, 8, and 9 were the highest water level 
observed during borehole installation. Borings at the remaining locations
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Figure 5. Cross-section A-B showing soils, groundwater table, and liquefiable sands 
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were converted to observation wells so that the groundwater here represents a 
piezometric surface that stabilized several days to months after the boring was made. 
The groundwater levels are consistently 5 to 8 m below the ground surface, and 
liquefiable sand deposits are confined within the upper 12 m of the soil column. 
 
Standard Penetration Tests (SPTs) were performed in borings 1 through 9 in 
accordance with ASTM D1586 [ASTM, 1999]. Representative uncorrected blow 
count values are shown in the figures at depths where sand deposits are assessed as 
potentially liquefiable.  
 
Potentially liquefiable soils were identified from the procedures summarized by Idriss 
and Boulanger [2008], whereby safety factor for liquefaction, FSL, is calculated by:  
7.5 * *L
CRRFS MSF K
CSR σ
 
=  
 
      (1) 
in which, CRR7.5 is the cyclic resistance ratio for the Mw = 6.7 Northridge 
earthquake and CSR is the cyclic stress ratio, determined for a peak ground velocity, 
amax= 0.36g that is consistent with both USGS Shakemap estimates for this location 
[USGS, 2008c] and estimates from the GIS database described previously for strong 
motion [Jeon and O’Rourke, 2005]. The MSF is the magnitude scaling factor and 
Kis the overburden correction factor, both of which were determined from SPT data 
according to the procedures and equations given by Idriss and Boulanger [2008]. 
 
All SPT data were corrected according to: 
( ) SRBENm CCCCCNN =601
     (2) 
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in which (N1)60 is the corrected SPT blow count, Nm is the SPT recorded in the 
boring log, and CNCECBCRCS is the product of correction factors for effective 
overburden pressure, hammer energy ratio, borehole diameter, rod length, and sample 
liners, respectively, as described by Idriss and Boulanger [2008]. The correction 
factors were determined directly from information collected from boring logs, driller 
logs, geotechnical reports that accompanied the data, and discussions with personnel 
associated with the site investigations. 
 
Sandy soils below the water table with low FSL are indicated in the cross-section. 
With the exception of the sand deposit in Boring 8 with a very low N-value, the FSL 
of these soils was mostly between 0.60 and 1.06. Some thin layers of sand were 
observed to be unstable and running during the borehole drilling, and they are 
identified as being potentially liquefiable. The cross-section shows that there are local 
lenses and layers of liquefiable sands. Hence, liquefaction or cyclic mobility during 
the Northridge earthquake may have been confined to local layers of sandy soil. The 
absence of direct evidence of liquefaction (e.g., sand boils and lateral spreading) in 
this area is consistent with the local nature of the liquefiable deposits. Reductions in 
shear modulus caused by elevated pore pressures in the loose sands during the 
earthquake may have contributed to local amplification of ground motion. Shear 
modulus reduction in sand layers within the upper 12.5 m of the soil column would 
increase the surface ground motions in a manner similar to that shown by the analyses 
of Boore, et al. [2003].   
 
In summary, there is compelling evidence for seismic hazard in the La Cienega area 
associated with elevated levels of strong ground motion. The location of highest 
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hazard, as evinced by local pipeline and bridge damage, appears to be located in a 
zone of previous swamps and streams that defines a low-lying topographic basin just 
north of Ballona Creek in the vicinity of La Cienega Blvd. Soft sediments associated 
with organic silts and clays remnant of previous marsh and streams, as well as  
liquefiable sands, could have influenced strong motion during the Northridge 
earthquake, and constitute a hazard for both transient and permanent ground 
deformation during a future earthquake. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MODELING PIPELINE RESPONSE TRANSIENT GROUND DEFORMATION 
 
PGVs predicted by the ShakeOut Scenario and measured during the Northridge 
earthquake are at comparable levels in the West Valley and Van Norman Complex 
areas shown in Figure 2. Moreover, trunk lines repaired after the Northridge 
earthquake in these areas remain vulnerable near and at locations of previous repair 
work. Given the similarity of ShakeOut and Northridge strong motions and the 
elevated potential for damage to the same pipelines that were damaged during the 
Northridge earthquake, it was decided to use the Northridge earthquake effects in 
these areas as a baseline for predicting damage. A pattern of trunk line damage from 
the ShakeOut scenario similar to that caused by the Northridge earthquake was 
therefore assumed in the West Valley and Van Norman Complex areas. 
 
Because of the seismic hazard described above for the La Cienega area, it was 
assumed that one of the LADWP trunk lines in this area would be damaged and 
leaking during the ShakeOut scenario. Moreover, damage at this location during the 
Northridge earthquake was used to guide the modeling process for damage to 
distribution pipelines caused by the ShakeOut scenario earthquake. 
 
Repair rates in the distribution system were modeled as being the larger of either: 1) 
RRs estimated on the basis of ShakeOut PGVs as described above, or 2) RRs 
consistent with those caused by the Northridge earthquake. Option 1 resulted in larger 
RRs for the West Valley and Van Norman Complex areas and was therefore used for 
these areas, and Option 2 was used for the La Cienega area. 
22 
CHAPTER 8 
PIPELINE DAMAGE FROM PERMANENT GROUND DEFORMATION 
 
The places where LADWP trunk lines intersect liquefaction hazards identified in the 
ShakeOut scenario earthquake were located by GIS to find where they are at highest 
risk of disruption from liquefaction-induced ground deformation. Damage to the trunk 
line system was then evaluated using the decision process illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Flow charts for estimating pipeline damage at PGD locations. 
 
Damage to the most fragile pipelines, composed of cast iron and asbestos cement, was 
modeled as a pipeline break where the pipelines cross zones of predicted ground 
movement of 100 - 150 mm or greater. Damage to jointed concrete and riveted steel 
pipelines was modeled as a pipeline leak where the pipelines cross zones of predicted 
ground movement of 100 – 150 mm or greater. Damage to welded steel pipelines, 
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typically constructed with welded slip joints, was modeled as leakage at select 
locations where the pipelines cross zones with greater than 300 mm of ground 
movement. A special algorithm described by Shi [2006] and Bonneau [2008] was used 
to predict leakage on the basis of pipeline type, likely modes of pipeline damage, and 
diameter.  
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CHAPTER 9 
SHAKEOUT SCENARIO PIPELINE DAMAGE AND SYSTEM 
SERVICEABILITY 
 
Hydraulic network analyses were performed with GIRAFFE using damage states 
associated with PGD and TGD as described above. Damage caused by PGD was 
modeled at specific locations in the system where LADWP pipelines cross PGD zones 
(see Figure 2) in accordance with the decision process depicted in Figure 6. Damage to 
pipelines and facilities, such as tanks, caused by TGD was modeled by means of the 
fragility relationships described previously. Such damage cannot be located explicitly, 
but is distributed throughout the system as described by Shi [2006] and Bonneau 
[2008] assuming that the generation of damage is consistent with a Poisson’s process. 
Monte Carlo simulations were run for TGD-induced damage using a special algorithm 
that evaluates the mean and standard deviation of the system serviceability index 
(SSI), defined as the ratio of water available at all system nodes after the earthquake to 
water available before the earthquake. The SSI mean and standard deviation are 
computed after each successive run until the standard deviation converges to within 
0.02 of the mean. 
 
All simulations were run for summer daily water demands. Such water usage was 
chosen to reflect post-earthquake conditions where service line leakage and damage to 
the interior piping of buildings and residential structures would draw more water from 
the system. Maximum demand typically occurs during the summer, and is somewhat 
higher than the demand that typically would be expected at the time of the ShakeOut 
emergency exercises. 
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Figure 7 presents a bar chart of the estimated pipeline repairs throughout the entire 
system caused by the ShakeOut scenario earthquake. The numbers of pipeline breaks 
and leaks are shown for the trunk line and distribution system .For this bar chart, trunk 
and distribution pipelines are those with nominal diameters ≥ 600 mm and < 600 mm, 
respectively. The percentages of breaks and leaks simulated by GIRAFFE are set by 
the user.  Breaks account for 5% of the damage and leaks account for the remainder. 
In this case, the percentages reflect those observed in the LADWP system after the 
Northridge earthquake. 
 
Figure 7. Bar chart of pipeline repairs caused by ShakeOut scenario earthquake 
 
Such information helps to understand the potential scale of the damage and provides 
emergency planners with guidance about the number of personnel required for system 
restoration and stockpiling of equipment for rapid repair. There are approximately 
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2,700 locations of pipeline damage predicted for the ShakeOut scenario earthquake. 
This compares with approximately 1,100 repairs after the 1994 Northridge earthquake. 
The higher number of repairs is driven primarily by the large PGVs associated with 
the ShakeOut ground motions over a larger area. 
 
Figure 8. Histogram of system serviceability immediately following and 24 hours after 
the ShakeOut scenario earthquake 
 
Figure 8 presents the SSI statistics for 0 and 24 hrs after the earthquake. Histograms 
are shown in which the number of Monte Carlo simulations resulting in a particular 
SSI is divided by the total number of simulations to provide an approximate 
probability index.  The histograms of “probability” allow one to compare performance 
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outcomes immediately after the earthquake and 24 hrs later. At 0 hrs the SSI has a 
mean of 76%, which decreases to a mean of 34% after 24 hrs. The simulations show 
that within one day approximately 66% of the system on average is unable to provide 
water at reliable levels of pressure and flow. As shown by the histograms there are 
some possible outcomes in which SSI drops as low as 25%. An effective use of the 
GIRAFFE simulations is to examine in detail the reasons for the lowest levels of 
performance. Such assessments reveal important vulnerabilities and suggest 
retrofitting and improvements in emergency response to boost system resilience. 
 
Figure 9.  System flow state and unsatisfied demands for: (a) 0 and (b) 24 hours after 
the ShakeOut scenario earthquake. 
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The deterioration in water supply performance is generated by losses from leaking 
pipelines that draw down tanks and reservoirs, causing some sections of the system to 
lose all local sources of water. Following such a large event, it will take some time to 
isolate and repair leaking pipelines. A period of 24 hrs was chosen in consultation with 
LADWP personnel as a representative interval for showing time-dependent losses 
before significant repair and restoration can be initiated.  In addition, the LADWP has 
35 water supply connections with MWD. In this analysis, the MWD transmission 
system is assumed to be sufficiently damaged that supply water cannot be provided to  
LADWP within the simulation time frame. 
 
Figure 9 shows the flow conditions in the trunk line system at 0 and 24 hrs after the 
earthquake for a single network analysis representing the median results of the Monte 
Carlo simulations. This figure provides information about the spatial distribution of 
flows and the way they diminish with time. The decrease in pipelines with reliable 
water flow and the increase in unsatisfied demand nodes are clearly shown by 
comparison of the 0 and 24 hr condition.  
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CHAPTER 10 
WATER SERVICE AREAS SERVICEABILITY  
 
There are 1,052 demand nodes that are geographically distributed throughout the 
system model. The SSI can be determined for the entire system, or a local 
serviceability index (SI) can be determined through GIS as the ratio of flow at demand 
nodes in specific locations before and after the earthquake.  
 
Figure 10. Location of LADWP water service areas 
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Figure 11. Bar chart of LADWP water service areas serviceability index (SI) 
 
The system response was evaluated for the 15 water service areas shown in Figure 10. 
Water service areas are geographic groupings of pipelines, pumps, valves, tanks, 
reservoirs, and demands that are evaluated individually by LADWP. From north to 
south the water service areas are: Granada Hills (GH), Foothill (FH), Sunland-Tujunga 
(ST), Valley Floor A, B and C (VF A, VF B, VF C), Encino Hills (EH), Santa Monica 
(SM), Hollywood Hills (HH), Mount Washington (MW), Highland Park (HP), Santa 
Ynez (SY), Westside (WS), Central City (CC), and Harbor (H).  The WS, CC, HP, 
and MW service areas are located in the zones of highest population density 
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[Bonneau, 2008]. By showing the results for the 15 water service areas, one is able to 
understand the spatial variability of system performance as expressed in terms of SI, 
and evaluate water supply response in areas of particular concern, such as those with 
highest population density. 
 
A bar chart for the SIs of the service areas is presented in Figure 11 for 0 and 24 hrs 
after the earthquake. The plot represents the median results of the Monte Carlo 
simulations. In this display the local losses in serviceability can be assessed with a 
relatively high degree of geographic detail. For example, the SIs at 24 hrs after the 
earthquake for three of the most densely populated zones in the WS, HP, and MW 
service areas show SIs of almost 0%, well below the mean SSI of 34%. The reasons 
for these low pockets of SI can be assessed by looking into the details of the hydraulic 
network analyses at these specific locations. In the WS, HP, and MW areas there are 
locations of PGD caused by soil liquefaction that contribute to pipeline damage and 
diminished flow. 
32 
CHAPTER 11 
EMERGENCY USE OF RESERVOIRS 
 
LADWP is presently undertaking an extensive capital improvement program to meet 
the requirements of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and California State 
Department of Health Services requirements with respect to surface water treatment 
and disinfection byproducts. Significant water system changes are necessary to meet 
the requirements. System changes include the removal of Encino, Hollywood, and 
Lower Stone Canyon Reservoirs from normal operating service, which places a much 
greater importance on the Los Angeles Reservoir for potable water supply. There is 
still the ability, however, to reconnect the Encino, Hollywood and Lower Stone 
Canyon Reservoirs for emergency use. 
 
Figure 12 shows the locations of the Los Angeles, Encino, Lower Stone Canyon, and 
Hollywood Reservoirs, as well as the approximate volume of water storage at each 
one.  Removing the Encino, Lower Stone Canyon, and Hollywood Reservoirs takes 
away up to 30 million m3 of water from immediate use. 
 
Although in-city storage capacity is being reduced, new trunk lines are being 
constructed that provide greater redundancy and flexibility. It is important to 
understand how the ability of the Los Angeles water system to withstand seismic 
hazards is affected as the water quality standards and new trunk line installations that 
are being implemented.  The system changes necessary to meet water quality 
standards raise questions concerning how the system may perform in future 
earthquake scenarios similar to or greater than what Los Angeles experienced in the 
1971 San Fernando and 1994 Northridge earthquakes.   
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Figure 12. Locations of LA, Encino, Lower Stone Canyon and Hollywood reservoirs 
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Figure 13 provides a graphical display of the LAWDP system response to the 
ShakeOut earthquake scenario with and without the disconnected reservoirs. The SSI 
statistics for 24 hrs after the earthquake are summarized in the histogram. The number 
of Monte Carlo simulations, which contribute to a particular SSI, was divided by the 
total number of simulations to provide an approximate probability index. The 
histograms of “probability” allow one to compare performance outcomes when the 
Encino, Lower Stone Canyon, and Hollywood Reservoirs are closed and open. The 
mean SSI increases by about 8% when the reservoirs are open as opposed to closed. 
The shift in the probability distributions can be seen clearly in the figure. 
Figure 13. SSI at 24 hours for ShakeOut scenario earthquake, using summer demands 
with Encino, Lower Stone Canyon and Hollywood reservoirs open and closed. 
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Figure 14 provides a similar display in which service area SIs associated with the most 
populated areas of Los Angeles are represented. These areas include water service 
areas, WS, CC, HP, and MW, which are geographically close to the Encino, Lower 
Stone Canyon, and Hollywood Hills Reservoirs. Because of the locally high 
populations, these areas of Los Angeles are likely to have the greatest need for water 
to fight post-earthquake fires. 
 
Figure 14. SI for WS, CC, HP, and MW water service areas at 24 hours after the 
ShakeOut scenario earthquake, using summer demands with Encino, Lower Stone 
Canyon and Hollywood reservoirs open and closed. 
 
The probability distributions for the most populated areas are substantially different 
from those for the entire system. The mean SI decreases from 0.38 with reservoirs 
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open to 0.21 with reservoirs closed. Not only does the mean SI increase by nearly 50% 
with reservoirs open, but the variance in outcomes decreases so that worst case 
possibilities are less likely. Perhaps the most important finding is that the worst case 
outcomes with reservoirs closed vary from 0.05 to 0.15.  Such low levels of water 
service would expose the most populated areas of Los Angeles to exceptionally high 
risk. 
 
With reservoirs open the probability distributions shift markedly to the right such that 
the worst case scenarios have SIs higher than the mean SI for reservoirs off. In some 
cases, water is available at nearly 50% of the demand nodes after 24 hrs. The results 
show that opening the reservoirs immediately after a serious earthquake improves 
serviceability so significantly that it is a plausible strategy for optimal emergency 
response, even though such action will require tap water safety notices to be issued for 
the entire system. 
 
These simulations illustrate how complex system decisions involving long-tern water 
quality standards and short-term emergency response measures can be supported by 
advanced systems modeling. Work, such as this, that links emergency response with 
public health decisions provides a good example of how system modeling provides the 
basis for decisions about geotechnical effects on a regional scale and the complex 
performance of critical lifeline networks. 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper presents the principal results for a simulation of the LADWP water 
transmission and distribution systems to a 7.8 MW earthquake on the southern San 
Andreas Fault. The simulation was performed as part of the 2008 ShakeOut 
earthquake preparedness drill, which was the largest exercise of its kind in US history. 
The simulation was performed with a decision support system and associated software 
developed through collaboration among university researchers and LADWP. The 
system is generic, and the architecture of its computer programs is adaptable to any 
water supply. The system works in conjunction with an easily accessible hydraulic 
network model, EPANET, which is available on-line from the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency [EPA, 2007] as well as a special program for damaged network 
flow modeling, known as Graphical Iterative Response Analysis for Flow Following 
Earthquakes (GIRAFFE). 
 
The simulation covered all 11,691 km of water trunk and distribution pipelines and 
related facilities (e.g., tanks, reservoirs, pressure regulation stations, etc.) in the 
LADWP system, plus the performance of the Los Angeles Aqueducts. The effects of 
seismic ground waves and of permanent ground deformation associated with fault 
rupture, liquefaction, and landslides, were modeled.  
 
Performance is quantified by means of a system serviceability index (SSI) and local 
serviceability index (SI) defined as the ratio of water flow after to water flow before 
the earthquake on both a system-wide and local level, respectively. The simulations 
show serious deterioration in the ability to deliver water 24 hrs after the earthquake, 
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which is generated by losses from leaking pipelines that draw down tanks and 
reservoirs. The mean SSI declines from 76 to 34 % over 24 hrs, which means that 66% 
of the normal water demand cannot be met one day after the main shock. The 
simulation shows nearly 2,700 locations of pipeline repair. Such damage requires 
careful planning to mobilize a work force of sufficient size for timely recovery and to 
acquire the parts and equipment for emergency repairs. Serviceability indices are 
summarized for 15 water service areas to show the spatial variability of system 
performance and evaluate water supply response in areas of particular concern, such as 
those with highest population density. Three locations of high population density show 
complete loss of service, thereby identifying locations of locally high vulnerability and 
potentially severe consequences. 
 
The LADWP system was modeled with and without several key reservoirs, which 
have been removed from normal operating service to meet water quality standards. 
The results show that opening the disconnected reservoirs immediately after a serious 
earthquake improves serviceability so significantly that it is a plausible strategy for 
optimal emergency response, even though such action will require tap water safety 
notices to be issued for the entire system.  Work, such as this, that links emergency 
response with public health decisions provides a good example of how system 
modeling supports decisions about geotechnical effects on a regional scale and the 
complex performance of critical lifeline networks. 
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